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I. INTRODUCTION
What do a high school diploma, an SAT score, and a urine sample
have in common? All are required to start undergraduate studies at Linn
State Technical College.' To begin its fall 2011 semester, Linn State
made history by becoming the first public college to implement a
mandatory drug screening program for all of its incoming students. On
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2013, University of
Miami School of Law; B.A. 2009, University of Michigan - Ann Arbor. I dedicate this paper to
my mother, Phyllis, for her never-ending love and support, and for being the strongest person I
know. I am extremely grateful to Professor Christina M. Frohock for being such an enthusiastic
and helpful advisor for this article. I also thank my family and friends for their support.
1. See Drug Screening, LINN ST. TECHNICAL C., https:H/myinfo.linnstate.edu/ics/Drug-
Screening.jnz (last visited Jan. 16, 2012); Linn State Technical College: Admission Requirements,
LINN ST. TECHNICAL C., http://www.linnstate.edu/admissions/requirements.php (last visited Jan.
16, 2012).
2. See Rachel Bloom, Pass a Drug Test Before You Can Pass a Class, ACLU BLOG RIGHTS
(Sept. 8, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/pass-drug-test-you-can-
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September 7, 2011, Linn State officials began removing small groups of
students from class in order to collect urine specimens.3 In order to be
prepared "for profitable employment and a life of learning,"4 students
began their college experience on equal constitutional footing as parol-
ees,5 probationers,' and children.7 They now must prove themselves
innocent, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, as they are treated with
distrust by their educational institution. The students are assessed an
extra fifty dollar fee in their tuition bill to pay for the testing of their
urine samples.8 Those who refuse to submit to the test are expelled, or as
the school states, subject to an "administrative withdrawal." 9 For stu-
dents whose tests return positive for drug use, a second test is required
after a forty-five day "grace period."'10 Failure to pass a second test will
also result in expulsion from the college, without refund if the refund
deadline has passed."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that mandatory urinalysis
drug tests are searches requiring the protections of the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 2 While searches are usually accompanied by a requirement of at
least some level of individualized suspicion, suspicionless drug testing
has been upheld as constitutional in several contexts under the special
needs doctrine.' 3 The special needs doctrine derives from a narrow
string of cases where an important governmental interest other than the
need for law enforcement outweighs an individual's privacy interest in a
warrant or individualized suspicion requirement.4
This article argues that dragnet drug screening programs geared
pass-class; Alan Scher Zagier, Linn State Technical College Begins Widespread Drug Tests,
HUFFINOTON POST (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/07/linn-state-
technical-coil n_952586.html.
3. See First Amended Complaint at 6, Barrett v. Claycomb, 2011 WL 5827783 (W.D. Mo.
Nov. 18, 2011) (No. I -CV-04242-NKL), available at http://www.linnstate.edu/drugscreening/
ACLU%20Lawsuit.pdf.
4. See Drug Screening, supra note 1.
5. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 (2006).
6. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119-20 (2001).
7. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 830 (2002).




12. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 828; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 (2001);
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
652 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 830; Acton, 515 U.S. at 604-65; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677;
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620.
14. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
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toward college students, such as the one imposed by Linn State, are
unconstitutional and cannot be saved by asserting the "special needs"
doctrine. Part II examines the Supreme Court precedent on suspicionless
drug testing in detail. This part compares how the Supreme Court has
analyzed suspicionless drug testing of adults with its analysis of suspi-
cionless drug testing of schoolchildren in the public school 5 context.
Part III discusses the applicability of this precedent to the college setting
as well as reviews the current case law on college-level drug testing.
This part offers a framework with which to analyze college drug testing
programs as potential special needs searches. Part IV discusses the cur-
rent litigation surrounding Linn State's drug screening program and
applies the framework developed in Part III to Linn State's case. Part V
concludes that mandatory, suspicionless drug screening programs, like
Linn State's, violate college students' Fourth Amendment rights. This
part briefly discusses the implications of upholding such programs and
what such a result would mean for the special needs doctrine and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.
II. WHEN Is SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTING CONSTITUTIONAL?
A. The Birth of "Special Needs"
The "hated" general warrants and writs of assistance effectuated by
the Crown against the colonists, notable for their lack of individualized
suspicion, were the chief evils the framers had in mind when drafting the
Fourth Amendment. 6 Implicit in the Fourth Amendment is a general
requirement of individualized suspicion before a search can be per-
formed. 7 However, the Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to the
individualized suspicion requirement, among them "those exceptional
15. While state colleges, such as Linn State, can also technically be called "public schools,"
this article uses the term "public school" to refer collectively to public elementary, middle, and
high schools. This article uses the word "college" to collectively refer to colleges, universities, and
other similar post-secondary institutions.
16. See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 858 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1965); Fabio
Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference: Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modem
Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1237 (2004). See also generally Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MIcH. L. REv. 547 (1999).
17. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 313 ("To be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a search
ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."). See also City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). The Amendment itself reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
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circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement imprac-
ticable." 8 This "category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches," known as special needs, should be "closely guarded" and is
applicable only in "limited circumstances." 9
Though the Court had already created exceptions to the individual-
ized suspicion requirement,2 ° the first mention of the phrase "special
needs" was in Justice Blackmun's 1985 concurring opinion in New
Jersey v. T.L.O. 2 ' T.L.O was a fourteen-year-old high school girl who,
along with another girl, was caught by a teacher smoking cigarettes in
the girls' bathroom at school. 22 The two girls were brought to the princi-
pal's office because smoking cigarettes in the bathroom was against
school rules. 23 When questioned in the office by Mr. Choplick, the assis-
tant vice principal, T.L.O. denied smoking either in the bathroom, or
ever at all. 24 The other girl admitted to smoking in the bathroom against
school rules.25 In response to T.L.O.'s denial, Mr. Choplick demanded
to see T.L.O.'s purse, in which he found not only cigarettes, but also
rolling papers.2 6 Because his experience taught him that rolling papers
were associated with marijuana use, Mr. Choplick then "thoroughly"
searched the purse for other evidence of drug use.27 Mr. Choplick found
"a small amount of marihuana [sic], a pipe, a number of empty plastic
bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index card
that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two
letters that implicated T.L.O. in marihuana [sic] dealing. 28 Mr.
Choplick notified both T.L.O.'s mother and the police of his findings.29
The State of New Jersey brought delinquency charges against T.L.O.
18. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
19. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308-09.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976) (holding brief
stops at permanent border checkpoints without individualized suspicion constitutional and noting
that while "some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search .... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion").
21. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This was not the first time a test
contrived in a concurring opinion eventually became a pillar of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."').
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and T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence of the allegedly unlawful
search of her purse.3"
While the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on the question
of whether the exclusionary rule applied to Fourth Amendment viola-
tions by school authorities, the Court ordered reargument on "the
broader question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on
the activities of school authorities."''1 The Court found that the search of
T.L.O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment because even
though the Fourth Amendment still applied to searches by school
authorities, the warrant and probable cause requirements were inapplica-
ble to the unique school setting and thus only an amorphous "reasona-
bleness" standard applied.32 The Court found that under the facts of
T.L.O., there were "reasonable grounds" for suspecting that the search
would reveal evidence of a violation of the law or school rules. 3
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun observed that the Court
engaged in a balancing of public and private interests in order to create
an exception to the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment. 34 Justice Blackmun then noted that this type of bal-
ancing is proper "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable."35 Justice Black-
mun agreed that school searches were such an "exceptional circum-
stance," but worried that the Court had too hastily engaged in the
balancing of interests to arrive at its result without first determining that
the school setting presented a special need.3 6 Essentially, in Justice
Blackmun's view, the Court skipped a necessary step, but still arrived at
the right result.37
Two years later, in O'Connor v. Ortega, the Court approvingly
quoted Justice Blackmun's T.L.O. concurrence and adopted the concept
of "special needs" when holding searches of government employees'
workplaces constitutional despite the absence of a warrant or even prob-
30. Id. at 329. T.L.O. also moved to suppress a confession she made after being brought to the
police headquarters. See id.
31. Id. at 332.
32. Id. at 337-42.
33. Id. at 342.
34. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
35. Id. Most of the "special needs" cases have quoted this line from Justice Blackmun's
T.L.O. concurrence. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S.
868, 873 (1987); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion).
36. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Id.
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able cause.38 Such searches were constitutional provided that they were
reasonable "under all the circumstances. '39 The Court found that a pub-
lic employer's interest in searching the workplace of an employee is
beyond a normal need for law enforcement, as the employer's interest is
in maintaining an effective and efficient operation of its agency .4 Next,
the Court found that a warrant or probable cause requirement would be
impracticable in the workplace.4' Finally, the Court balanced public and
private interests and lessened the probable cause requirement to one of
reasonableness, mirroring the standard adopted in T.L.O.42 The concept
of "special needs" transformed from dicta to doctrine.43
While in both cases the Court developed a "reasonableness" stan-
dard in circumventing the Fourth Amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements, the facts of both T.L. 0. and O'Connor still retained
an element of individualized suspicion, though less than probable cause.
However, in each case the Court expressly declined to answer whether
individualized suspicion was an essential element of its reasonableness
standard.44
38. See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 725-26.
39. See id. The Court again provided little guidance as to what reasonable under the
circumstances actually meant, but added that "[o]rdinarily, a search of an employee's office by a
supervisor will be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that
the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file."
Id. at 726.
40. Id. at 724.
41. Id. at 724-25.
42. Id. at 725-26.
43. Strikingly absent from the majority was Justice Blackmun himself who authored the
dissent. See id. at 732-33 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Because there was no 'special need' to
dispense with the warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, I would
evaluate the search by applying this traditional standard. Under that standard, this search clearly
violated Dr. Ortega's Fourth Amendment rights.") (internal citation omitted). The Court cited
Blackmun's T.L.O. concurrence again three months later when holding searches of probationers'
homes a valid special need. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987). Justice
Blackmun again authored a dissent noting that while the supervision of probationers is a "special
need" justifying a reduced level of suspicion, the warrant requirement should still apply to such
searches. See id. at 881-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This solution would have been utterly
irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment's explicit provision that "no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause." U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV; see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877 (majority
opinion).
44. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.8 (1985) ("We do not decide whether
individualized suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for
searches by school authorities. . . .Because the search of T.L.O.'s purse was based upon an
individualized suspicion ...we need not consider the circumstances that might justify school
authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion."); O'Connor, 480
U.S. at 726 ("Because petitioners had an 'individualized suspicion' of misconduct by Dr. Ortega,
we need not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the standard of
reasonableness that we adopt today.").
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B. Suspicionless Drug Testing as a Special Need
Four years after T.L.O., the Supreme Court issued two opinions on
the same day applying the special needs doctrine to mandatory suspi-
cionless drug testing-Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass 'n4" and
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab.46 These two cases
ensured drug testing a place in the sphere of special needs. They also
made clear that special needs searches do not always require individual-
ized suspicion to be "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.47
In Skinner, railway labor organizations challenged, and the
Supreme Court upheld, the constitutionality of newly promulgated fed-
eral regulations concerning drug and alcohol testing of railroad employ-
ees.4 8 The regulations required railroads to collect blood and urine
samples of all employees directly involved in a train accident and to
send the samples to the Federal Railroad Administration for laboratory
analysis.4 9 The regulations also authorized, but did not mandate, breath
and urine tests in other circumstances, such as when a supervisor had
"reasonable suspicion" that an employee was under the influence of
alcohol. 50 These regulations were the Federal Railroad Administration's
response to findings that pervasive drug and alcohol use among railroad
employees was a cause of a number of train accidents involving multiple
fatalities and injuries as well as significant property damage.51
Citing concerns of medical privacy and bodily integrity, the Court
importantly held that the collection and testing of urine is a search under
the Fourth Amendment.52 This holding ensured that all future drug test-
ing programs would be analyzed under Fourth Amendment scrutiny.53
Next, guided by Justice Blackmun's T.L.O. concurrence, the Court
engaged in a special needs analysis. 54 The Court easily found the gov-
ernment's interest not one of "normal law enforcement," but rather a
45. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
46. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
47. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
48. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612-13.
49. Id. at 609-10.
50. Id. at 611. Despite the fact that this part of the regulations was permissive and performed
by a private railroad company, the Fourth Amendment was nevertheless implicated because the
Court found the railroads were acting "as an instrument or agent of the government." The
mandatory provisions of the regulations implicated the Fourth Amendment because railroads
complying with the provision do so by "compulsion of sovereign authority." See id. at 614.
51. Id. at 607-08.
52. Id. at 617. At the time, every Federal Court of Appeals had already come to the same
conclusion. See id.
53. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n.9 (2001) ("[I]n our special
needs cases, we have routinely treated urine screens taken by state agents as searches within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
54. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
2012]
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need to prevent train accidents and ensure the safety of others." The
Court then engaged in balancing the interests of the government and its
"need" with the railroad employees' privacy interests in a requirement of
individualized suspicion. 6
The main purpose of the drug testing was to determine if drugs or
alcohol were present in the body at the time the accident occurred.5 7 The
Court found that a warrant requirement would frustrate that purpose
because the body could metabolize traces of drugs or alcohol in the time
taken to obtain a warrant.5 ' Additionally, railroad supervisors, unlike
those engaged in law enforcement, are unfamiliar with the procedures of
obtaining a warrant.59 The Court similarly found a requirement of indi-
vidualized suspicion unnecessary due to what it saw as the minimal
intrusion on the employees' privacy and the government's compelling
interest in obtaining the drug tests, which would be "significantly hin-
dered" by such a requirement.60 Suspicionless, mandatory drug testing
was, for the first time, approved by the Supreme Court.
Though decided on the same day, Skinner laid the groundwork for
the validation of the much broader drug testing regime addressed in Von
Raab. Von Raab involved a drug screening requirement for U.S. Cus-
toms Service employees seeking a transfer or promotion to positions
involving direct involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the
employee to handle a firearm.61 Again, based on a similar analysis per-
formed in Skinner, the Court found the drug testing program constitu-
tional despite the absence of a warrant, probable cause, or any other
level of individualized suspicion.62 What made Von Raab different, and
more far reaching than Skinner, was the absence of any actual problem
within the U.S. Customs Service.63 No drug problem existed among the
employees and no major incident sparked the implementation of the
55. Id. at 620.
56. Id. at 621.
57. Id. at 623.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 623-24.
60. Id. at 631, 633.
61. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1989).
62. See id. at 677, 679.
63. Indeed, this difference is what caused Justices Scalia and Stevens to dissent in Von Raab
even though both approved of the drug testing program in Skinner. See id. at 680-81 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("Today, in Skinner, we allow a less intrusive bodily search of railroad employees
involved in train accidents. I joined the Court's opinion there because the demonstrated frequency
of drug and alcohol use by the targeted class of employees, and the demonstrated connection
between such use and grave harm, rendered the search a reasonable means of protecting society. I
decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use nor
connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely.").
[Vol. 67:217
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drug screening program.' 4 Justice Scalia's dissent decried the program
as merely "symbolic,"6 while the majority highlighted the potential
threat to safety and the need to deter a problem before it actually
occurred.66 The majority also generalized the "pervasive social problem"
of drug abuse, which "Itihere is little reason to believe that American
workplaces are immune from."67 This generalization and focus on deter-
ring a potential threat led many to fear that the Supreme Court would
widely approve of suspicionless drug testing programs so long as the
government merely asserted some threat to safety, whether real or spec-
ulative.68 Chandler v. Miller69 assuaged those fears and defined the
scope of Von Raab's holding.
Chandler concerned a Georgia statute requiring candidates for cer-
tain state offices to certify that they had submitted to and passed a
urinalysis drug test within thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination
or election.70 Failure to do so would disqualify the candidate from
appearing on the ballot.71 In the 1994 state election, the Libertarian party
nominated candidates for three positions covered by the statute.72 The
three candidates challenged the statute as an unreasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment.73 In defense of the constitutionality of the
requirement, the State of Georgia argued that the drug testing require-
ment was a special need. 74 The state readily conceded that the statute
64. See id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What is absent in the Government's
justifications-notably absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am concerned dispositively
absent-is the recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles actually
occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of bribe-taking, or of poor aim, or of
unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified information, was drug use....
The Commissioner of Customs himself has stated that he 'believe[s] that Customs is largely drug-
free,' that '[t]he extent of illegal drug use by Customs employees was not the reason for
establishing this program,' and that he 'hopets] and expect[s] to receive reports of very few
positive findings through drug screening."').
65. Id. at 681.
66. See id. at 675 (majority opinion).
67. Id. at 674. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, dubiously stated that the decision in
Skinner "amply illustrated" how American workplaces are not immune from pervasive drug
abuse. See id. However in Skinner, there was concrete evidence of a drug problem which is
precisely what differentiated it from Von Raab in the first place. Thus, the Court merely
bootstrapped the evidence of drug abuse in Skinner to justify its holding and compensate for the
lack of evidence in Von Raab.
68. See, e.g., id. at 685 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Employee Drug Testing, 103 HARV. L. REV.
269, 279 (1989); Kenneth C. Haas, The Supreme Court Enters the "Jar Wars": Testing, Public
Employees, and the Fourth Amendment, 94 DICK. L. REv. 305, 335-36, 371 (1990).
69. 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
70. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309,
71. Id.
72. See id. at 310.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 318.
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was not enacted in response to any suspicion of drug use by candidates
for state office and that Georgia did not have any particular problem of
state officeholders using illegal drugs. 75 Nonetheless, relying on the rea-
soning of Von Raab, the State of Georgia argued that the lack of a par-
ticular drug problem was not fatal to its argument and that the possible
use of illegal drugs by state officeholders "draws into question an offi-
cial's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge of public func-
tions, including antidrug law enforcement efforts; and undermines
public confidence and trust in elected officials. ' 76 The statute was thus
necessary because of its deterrent effect on the potential hazard of drug
users running for and attaining state offices. While the State of Geor-
gia's argument essentially mirrored the Supreme Court's opinion in Von
Raab, the Court found the statute violated the Fourth Amendment in an
8-1 opinion.77 Notably, (echoing Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab)
the Court stated that Georgia's asserted need was "symbolic, not 'spe-
cial"' and that "[t]he Fourth Amendment shields society" from state
action that "diminishes personal privacy for a symbol's sake."78 The
Court held that "blanket suspicionless searches" were constitutional only
if they were "calibrated" to a "substantial and real" risk to public
safety.79 The Court emphasized the requirement that public safety must
be "genuinely in jeopardy."8
The only way to reconcile Chandler with Von Raab is to first
accept, perhaps as a necessary fiction, that the Von Raab Court really
believed the Custom Service's purported deterrent, rather than symbolic
purpose for drug testing. In Chandler, the Court was faced with a Von
Raab situation (where drug testing was asserted as a special need to
deter people in important positions from abusing drugs when there was
admittedly no evidence of a drug problem) and came to the opposite
outcome relying on reasoning similar to that of Scalia's Von Raab dis-
sent.81 In Von Raab the need was special, but this time the Court found
the program to be merely symbolic due to the absence of evidence of a
"concrete danger. "82 Perhaps recognizing this inconsistency, the Court
"made a strenuous effort" and "went out of its way" to distinguish and
75. See id. at 319.
76. Id. at 318.
77. See id. at 322. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the sole dissenter noting that the Court's
decision was irreconcilable with Von Raab. See id. at 324-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 322 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 323.
80. Id.
81. See Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He Is Quiet": Suspicionless
Searches, "Special Needs" and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 517 (2004).
82. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319.
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limit Von Raab.83 The Court described Von Raab as "[h]ardly a decision
opening broad vistas for suspicionless searches" and instructed that
"Von Raab must be read in its unique context."'84 The Court also noted
that the drug testing regime in Von Raab concerned an agency with a
"unique mission" with inherently "grave safety threats. 85 According to
the Chandler Court, in Von Raab it was "compelling" to make sure that
drug users were not in such "high-risk" positions.86 The Court also
recast Von Raab as not having as speculative a need by noting that there
was some concrete evidence of Customs officials succumbing to bribery
by drug smugglers.87
Chandler was the first case where the Supreme Court found a sus-
picionless drug testing program unconstitutional.8 8 In addition to limit-
ing Von Raab, the Court also redefined the special needs analysis by
carefully analyzing the threshold question of whether the asserted need
was actually "special" rather than going straight to balancing public and
private interests.8 9 For suspicionless searches, this threshold would be
met only by showing a "substantial and real" threat to public safety.90
The Court warned that where "public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy,
the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter
how conveniently arranged." 9'
Ferguson v. City of Charleston92 reaffirmed the vitality of the prin-
ciple that the Court would perform a threshold inquiry and not take the
state's assertion of a special need at face-value when evaluating the
applicability of the special needs doctrine.93 Ferguson involved a state
hospital drug testing the urine samples of maternity patients who fit a
profile of suspected cocaine use.94 The drug testing policy was a
response to the growing number of prenatal care patients using
83. Sundby, supra note 81, at 517.
84. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321.
85. Id. at 316.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 321.
88. See Arcila, supra note 16, at 1229.
89. See Joy L. Ames, Note, Chandler v. Miller: Redefining "Special Needs"for Suspicionless
Drug Testing Under the Fourth Amendment, 31 AKRON L. REv. 273, 288 (1997).
90. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
91. Id. The need asserted in Von Raab arguably comports with this construction of the term
"special need." See id. at 321-22 (distinguishing state elected officials from Customs officers
because elected officials, unlike Customs officers, "do not perform high-risk, safety-sensitive
tasks").
92. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
93. Id. at 81. See also Sundby, supra note 81, at 527-28.
94. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71. Though the patients who were drug tested fit a certain profile,
the Court doubted whether the criteria the hospital employed in its policy would even give rise to
reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, for drug use. See id. at 76, 77 & n.10.
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cocaine. 95 The hospital's policy had been developed with the help of law
enforcement officials.96 Women who tested positive for cocaine use
were threatened with arrest if they did not participate in a drug treatment
program.97 Due to the procedural posture of the case, the Court assumed
in its special needs analysis that the patients did not consent to the drug
screening of their urine samples. 98
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, noted that in each of the
Court's previous drug testing cases, the special need was one which was
"divorced" from the government's interest in law enforcement. 99 This
drug testing program, on the other hand, involved law enforcement dur-
ing its development and implementation and used law enforcement and
the threat of prosecution to coerce the patients into substance abuse
treatment.100 The hospital argued that its "ultimate purpose" was the
"beneficent" one of protecting the health of the patient and newborn and
thus distinguishable from the general interest in crime control. 101 Justice
Stevens, citing Chandler, noted that the Court would not merely accept
the state's assertion of a "special need" and that the Court must carry out
a "'close review' of the scheme at issue" to determine if the need was in
fact special.102 The Court proceeded to examine the record and "con-
sider all the available evidence" to determine the validity of the claim
that the primary purpose of the drug testing was distinguishable from a
"general interest in crime control."1 0 3 The Court rejected the hospital's
asserted beneficent purpose and found "the immediate objective of the
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes.""
Even if an ultimate goal of the policy was to get drug addicted mothers
into treatment, the reason for the drug tests was to ensure the threat of
prosecution was real due to the use of the drug test results as evidence in
potential criminal proceedings. 10 5 Thus, Ferguson ensured that the Court
would "scrutinize the underlying record and develop its own judgment
of whether the drug testing satisfied its developing 'special needs' juris-
prudence" rather than just accept the state's purported purpose. 106
95. See id. at 70.
96. See id. at 70-72.
97. See id. at 72.
98. See id. at 77.
99. Id. at 79.
100. See id. at 80.
101. Id. at 81.
102. Id. (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997)).
103. Id. at 81-82.
104. Id. at 83.
105. Id. at 83-84.
106. Sundby, supra note 81, at 528.
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C. Suspicionless Drug Testing in the Public School Context:
The Trilogy of T.L.O., Acton, and Earls
While noting that students do not "shed their constitutional rights
. . . at the schoolhouse gate," 107 the Supreme Court has nevertheless
limited the Fourth Amendment rights of public school students in three
important decisions-T.L.O., Veronia School District 47J v. Acton,
10 8
and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Potta-
watomie County v. Earls.10 9 These cases largely relied on the age of the
students and the unique setting of a public school, which exercises tem-
porary custody over schoolchildren. While Justice Blackmun's concur-
rence in T.L.O. introduced the concept of "special needs" to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, 110 T.L.O. is also significant for laying the
foundation for the limitations of schoolchildren's Fourth Amendment
rights.
T.L.O. eliminated the probable cause requirement for searches of
schoolchildren and maintained that the only requirement of such school
searches is that they be "reasonable." '111 Acton did away with the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement entirely for the drug testing of student-
athletes.' 12 Earls expanded Acton's holding to all schoolchildren
engaged in any extracurricular activity.1 13 Together, these cases stand
for the proposition that schoolchildren have a fundamentally lessened
reasonable expectation of privacy. 14 Students retain some Fourth
Amendment protections, but for special needs searches, where the indi-
vidualized suspicion requirement has been eliminated for both adults
and children alike, schoolchildren have watered-down Fourth Amend-
ment rights. School officials' actions are given greater deference and
meeting the criterion of "special" is much more easily surmountable
over a student's lessened privacy interest.
1 15
In T.L.O., the Supreme Court wrestled with the question of how the
Fourth Amendment applied to schoolchildren.' 16 The decision sought to
find a balance between sacrificing a student's Fourth Amendment rights
107. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding that
public school students had a First Amendment right to wear black armbands to school in protest of
the Vietnam War).
108. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
109. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
110. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
111. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985). For the facts of T.L.O., see supra
notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
112. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
113. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 831, 834-37.
116. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332.
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entirely and granting the same protections as given to adults.' 17 The
Court reached a middle-ground in its vague "reasonableness" stan-
dard. "' While students did have legitimate expectations of privacy, they
were not entitled to a warrant or probable cause requirement before they
could be searched, but ordinarily searches would have to be based on
reasonable suspicion. 19 The Court noted the school setting was unique
because "swift and informal disciplinary procedures" are necessary for
teachers to maintain order in the school.
1 20
Interestingly, the rationales of T.L.O.'s concurring opinions are
what echo throughout the majority opinions in Acton and Earls. Justice
Blackmun's concurrence developed the concept of special needs. 1
21 Jus-
tice Powell's concurrence, which Justice O'Connor joined, went into
detail regarding the "special characteristics" of the school setting. 122 Jus-
tice Powell focused mainly on the relationship teachers have with their
students. 23 Powell noted that teachers enjoy "a degree of familiarity
with, and authority over, their students" that resembles a parent-child
relationship.' 24 He contrasted the adversarial relationship between law
enforcement officers and criminal suspects with the shared interests of
students and teachers. 125 Teachers, according to Justice Powell, have
personal responsibility for their students' welfare in addition to their
education. 126 Justice Powell then stressed the importance of maintaining
discipline and order for a school to educate its students.
127
In Acton, the Court for the first time considered, and upheld,
mandatory drug testing in the public school context. 28 In response to a
"sharp increase in drug use,"' 129 an Oregon school district instituted a
policy of random drug testing of student-athletes.' 30 Athletes were
targeted because they were "the leaders of the drug culture" and because
117. See id. at 340.
118. See id. at 340-42.
119. See id.
120. Id. at 340.
121. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
122. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powel, J., concurring).
123. See id. at 348-50.
124. Id. at 348.
125. See id. at 349-50. Interestingly, while T.L.O. was not strictly a "special needs" case
because the concept had not yet been formally adopted by the Court, Justice Powell's comparison
between the teacher-student relationship and the adversarial police-suspect relationship
foreshadowed the Court's later-defined principle that the primary purpose of a special needs
search must not be rooted in law enforcement. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67, 81-82 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000).
126. See T.L.O., 469 U.S at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
127. See id.
128. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
129. Id. at 648.
130. See id. at 648-50.
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of the risk of sports-related injuries. 131 The Supreme Court upheld the
drug testing policy as a special needs search. 132 Specifically, the Court
looked at three factors: "the nature of the privacy interest," 133 "the char-
acter of the intrusion that is complained of 134 and "the nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue here, and the efficacy
of this means for meeting it.
' 135
In examining the nature of the privacy interest, the Court noted that
legitimate expectations of privacy vary with both context and the indi-
vidual's legal relationship with the state.1 36 Relying on T.L.O., the Court
first found that schoolchildren have a lowered expectation of privacy
due to the "custodial and tutelary" relationship between the school and
the student. 137 The Court declared that the fact that the individuals being
drug tested were children in the temporary custody of the state was "cen-
tral" to its holding. 13 The Court noted that at common law, unemanci-
pated minors lack some fundamental rights and are subject to school
authorities who act in loco parentis over children in their custody.
139
This echoed the importance Justice Powell placed on the student-teacher
relationship in his T.L.O. concurrence. 4 ' The Court also found that stu-
dent-athletes have an even lesser expectation of privacy than ordinary
schoolchildren because they engage in "communal undress" in the
locker room and because by choosing to participate in school sports they
subject themselves to a higher degree of regulation. 4 '
The Court next weighed the students' lowered expectation of pri-
vacy against the school district's need to deter drug use by its school-
children.142 The Court found that deterring drug use by the nation's
schoolchildren "is at least as important" an interest as deterring drug use
among railroad workers and customs agents.' 43 According to the Court,
the government in this case had an even greater interest in acting to
counter drug use among its students because it took on a "special
responsibility of care and direction" for them. 4 Thus, for the purposes
131. Id. at 649.
132. See id. at 653, 664-65.
133. Id. at 654.
134. Id. at 658.
135. Id. at 660. While this third factor actually has two components, the Court treated it as one
factor.
136. See id. at 654.
137. Id. at 655.
138. Id. at 654.
139. See id. at 654-55.
140. See supra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
141. Acton, 515 U.S. at 657.
142. See id. at 660-61.
143. Id. at 661.
144. Id. at 662.
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of balancing interests, the school's custodial relationship simultaneously
decreased the students' interest in privacy and magnified the state's
interest in drug testing. This "double-counting" highlights the signifi-
cance of the custodial relationship to upholding drug testing programs in
public schools. The Court also was persuaded by an "immediate crisis"
affecting the school based on the documented history of a drug
problem. 145
In Earls, the Court upheld a drug screening program like the one in
Acton, only this time it applied to students engaging in all extracurricu-
lar activities instead of only student-athletes.' 46 The jump from Acton to
Earls paralleled that from Skinner to Von Raab. Both former cases had
drug testing programs implemented after actual evidence of a problem
was presented.147 In the later cases, the Court allowed for drug testing
even in the absence of evidence of a concrete problem by citing the need
for the deterrent effect of a possible future problem. 4 8 It was a special
need merely to prevent the potential problem and the Court's balancing
test favored the government's need. Earls relied heavily on Acton, espe-
cially with regard to its focus on the unique public school setting "where
the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety."' 49
Earls, however, was silent as to how it could be reconciled with Chan-
dler's requirement of a "substantial and real" threat to public safety.
Earls, nevertheless, is distinguishable from Chandler because it deals
with minors in the state's custody. 15 0 In Earls, as in Acton, the state took
responsibility for the schoolchildren and thus it was in the state's interest
to protect them from the dangers of drugs.' 5 '
Thus, for schoolchildren only, the Supreme Court is willing to find
the threat of "the nationwide drug epidemic" sufficient to establish a
special need. 52 However, for adults, no post-Chandler decision has
altered the requirement of a genuine threat to public safety to sidestep
the requirement of individualized suspicion.
145. Id. at 663.
146. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 830 (2002).
147. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 662-63; Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
607-08 (1989).
148. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 849-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 673-744 (1989).
149. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830-31 (majority opinion).
150. See Arcila, supra note 16, at 1233 n.44.
151. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
152. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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III. SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTING REACHES THE COLLEGE CAMPUS
A. Current Case Law on College Student Drug Testing
Currently, almost all of the drug testing that occurs at the college
level is geared toward student-athletes.1 53 Because Linn State's drug
testing program is unprecedented, the case law on the drug testing of
ordinary college students is scant. In fact, only one public college (aside
from Linn State) currently has a drug testing policy that applies to ordi-
nary students, as opposed to student-athletes.154 The University of Mary-
land mandates a drug test for any student who is found guilty of a drug
offense. 155 However, by its own terms, individualized suspicion is a pre-
requisite for such a drug test as the use of a drug test is dependent on a
previous finding of guilt. Drug testing of college athletes is largely con-
ducted by the NCAA, which has been held not to be a state actor.
1 56
However, some college athletes at state universities have gone to court
to challenge drug tests administered by their schools. An interesting
example is University of Colorado v. Derdeyn.
157
In the fall of 1984, the University of Colorado, Boulder, developed
a drug testing program for its intercollegiate student-athletes.' 58 If a stu-
dent-athlete failed to sign a consent form for random urinalysis drug
testing, the student was barred from participating in intercollegiate ath-
letics. 159 Although the drug testing policy was amended several times,
the penalty for testing positive for drug use was never more severe than
a suspension from intercollegiate athletics for a period of time.' 6 ' In
1986, several University of Colorado student-athletes filed a lawsuit,
eventually making its way to the Supreme Court of Colorado, challeng-
ing the drug testing policy on both state and federal constitutional
grounds. '61
The University of Colorado argued that even if the drug testing
policy were otherwise unconstitutional, the students consented to the
drug testing. 62 The Supreme Court of Colorado, however, found that
the "consent" was not given voluntarily. 63 In analyzing whether the
153. 2 ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 8:7 (2d ed.).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 182 (1988). The Fourth
Amendment applies only to state actors. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (t985)
(quoting Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921)).
157. 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993).
158. Id. at 930.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 930-32.
161. Id. at 930, 932.
162. See id. at 946.
163. See id. at 949-50.
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drug testing was constitutional without consent, the court relied on Skin-
ner and Von Raab and proceeded to balance the students' privacy inter-
ests with the university's governmental interests.1 64 The court first
decided that university students do not have a diminished expectation of
privacy "simply because they are university students."1 65 The court
noted the inapplicability of cases like T.L.O. and the common law doc-
trine of in loco parentis to the college setting.166 Interestingly, the court
even cited the district court opinion in Acton as an example of a high
school case inapplicable to the college context. 67 The court easily rec-
ognized that the Fourth Amendment rights of college students should be
analyzed like those of adults rather than high school students or other
schoolchildren.1 68 Next, despite various arguments to the contrary, the
court found that the urinalysis drug testing was a "clearly significant"
intrusion and that the status of being a student-athlete did not diminish
one's expectation of privacy. 
1 69
The Supreme Court of Colorado noted that the trial court below
made a finding of fact that there was "no evidence that the University
instituted its program in response to any actual drug abuse problem
among its student athletes" or "that any person has ever been injured in
any way because of the use of drugs by a student athlete while practicing
or playing a sport."' 70 The governmental interests asserted by the uni-
versity were compliance with NCAA rules, fair competition, and student
health and safety concerns. 171 With impressive foresight, the court read
Skinner and Von Raab to hold that generally an interest is "compelling"
enough to do away with an individualized suspicion requirement when
there is a threat to public safety or national security-a similar conclu-
sion arrived at by the Supreme Court four years later in Chandler.1 72 As
Chandler had not yet been decided, and, thus, the available precedent
lacked a threshold inquiry of whether the need was really "special," the
court understandably noted that the absence of a public safety threat was
not dispositive, but only a factor in its balancing of interests.1 73 The
court held that because the lack of a public safety interest was coupled
164. Id. at 936.
165. Id. at 938.
166. Id. at 938-39 (collecting federal cases uniformly rejecting the applicability of in loco
parentis to the college setting or any other argument that college students have diminished Fourth
Amendment rights).
167. Id. at 939. Acton had not yet produced a Court of Appeals decision.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 939-43.
170. Id. at 934.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 943-45. See also supra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
173. See Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 945.
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with the absence of a showing that the student-athletes had a diminished
expectation of privacy, the drug testing policy violated the Fourth
Amendment as well as the state constitution.174
Not all courts have followed Derdeyn. In another case where col-
lege athletes challenged a drug testing policy, Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association,175 the court reached an opposite result. In Hill,
Stanford University student-athletes challenged NCAA drug testing as
violating a state right to privacy. 176 The Supreme Court of California
held the state law provision applied to non-state actors like the NCAA,
but nevertheless upheld the drug testing policy. 177 Though the state con-
stitutional right to privacy applied to non-state actors, 78 the privacy it
protected was construed as "no broader" than the protections afforded by
the Fourth Amendment. 17 9 Unlike the Supreme Court of Colorado in
Derdeyn, the Supreme Court of California found that by participating in
intercollegiate athletics, student-athletes did have a diminished expecta-
tion of privacy. 8 ' The court found a diminished expectation of privacy
because college athletes are subject to "close regulation and scrutiny of
the physical fitness and bodily condition" and "physical examinations
(including urinalysis), and special regulation of sleep habits, diet, fit-
ness, and other activities that intrude significantly on privacy interests
are routine aspects of a college athlete's life not shared by other students
or the population at large."'8' Here, by comparing student-athletes to
ordinary students, the court implicitly agreed that ordinary college stu-
dents do not share the diminished expectation of privacy of student-ath-
letes. The court then weighed the interests of the NCAA in drug
testing-"safeguarding the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competi-
tion" and "protecting the health and safety of student athletes"-against
174. See id. The Supreme Court of Colorado thus reached the same principles that emerged
after Chandler and Earls-that the absence of a public safety threat can only be cured by drug
testing a population with a greatly diminished expectation of privacy, such as schoolchildren. See
supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
175. 865 P.2d 633 (1994).
176. Id. at 637. Interestingly, Stanford University intervened on the side of the student-athletes.
See id.
177. See id. at 637, 644.
178. See id. at 644.
179. See id. at 650 n.9. Even though the Court found its state law right to privacy to not be
broader than Fourth Amendment protections, the Supreme Court of California only made a
finding with regards to its state constitution and not the federal constitution. See id at 669. Indeed,
the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to this case where a non-state actor, the NCAA, was sued
rather than a state college. A similar state law action filed against a private university also failed
on state law grounds alone and did not include a Fourth Amendment question because of a lack of
state action. See Bally v. Ne. Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49, 51 & n.3 (1989).
180. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 658.
181. Id. (emphasis added).
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the diminished privacy expectations of the student-athletes. 182 The court
found in favor of the NCAA.' 83
Hill strongly influenced the decision in Brennan v. Board of Trust-
ees for University of Louisiana Systems.1 84 In Brennan, a student-athlete
challenging drug testing sued the University of South Louisiana's gov-
erning body. 185 The action was brought under state privacy laws.' 86 The
court noted that the University of South Louisiana "without question" is
a state actor. 187 However, relying on the balancing of interests per-
formed in Hill, including the finding that student-athletes have a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy, the court found the drug testing policy did
not violate the state constitution.
88
Derdeyn remains the only student-athlete drug testing decision to
establish case law expressly based on the Fourth Amendment, rather
than state law grounds. 89 It is somewhat of an outlier because it is also
the only decision to find that student-athletes do not have a diminished
expectation of privacy and that the state interests were not sufficient to
182. Id. at 659. While not mentioning drug testing specifically, New York Times columnist Joe
Nocera has recently written a series of op-eds ridiculing the NCAA and its policies and suggesting
that, perhaps, the NCAA might not be the ideal organization to represent reasonable interests. See,
e.g., Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Guilty Until Proved Innocent, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2012, at A23; Joe
Nocera, Op-Ed., More N.C.A.A. 'Justice', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2012, at A21; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed.,
Standing Up to the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2012, at A19; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The
College Sports Cartel, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A23.
183. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 669.
184. 691 So. 2d 324 (La. Ct. App. 1997).
185. See id. at 325.
186. See id. at 328.
187. Id. at 329.
188. See id. at 329.
189. One other court did address the Fourth Amendment issue. See O'Halloran v. Univ. of
Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash.), rev'd, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988). The court
found the drug testing of student-athletes to not violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at
1002-07. However, the district court was reversed on procedural grounds by the Ninth Circuit
which directed the case to be remanded back to state court where it originated. See O'Halloran v.
Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988). The Ninth Circuit did not address the Fourth
Amendment issue. Prior to removal to federal court, the state trial court balanced public and
private interests and ruled that the drug testing policy did indeed violate the Fourth Amendment.
See Stephen F. Brock & Kevin M. McKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 DICK. L. REV. 505,
549-551 (1988) (citing O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., No. 87-2-08775-1 (Wash. Super., King
County, July 23, 1987) (Transcript of oral opinion)). Subsequently, O'Halloran and the University
of Washington entered into a settlement agreement in which the university agreed to eliminate its
random drug testing and only drug test based on reasonable suspicion. See Stephen F. Brock et.
al., Drug Testing College Athletes: NCAA Does Thy Cup Runneth Over?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 53,
93 & n.217 (1994) (citing O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., No. 87-2-08775-1, at I (Wash. Super.
Ct. June 26, 1989) (Stipulation and Order of Dismissal); O'Halloran and University of
Washington Partial Settlement Agreement, at 1-2 (1989)). O'Halloran has been called a "three-
headed procedural monster" that "established no rule of law." See id. at 89, 94. Thus, Derdeyn
remains the only Fourth Amendment decision with any real precedential value.
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overcome individual privacy interests.19 ° On the other hand, several
courts have found student-athletes to have diminished privacy interests
and have upheld mandatory, suspicionless drug testing of student-ath-
letes.' 9' However, prior to Linn State initiating its drug screening pro-
gram, no court had ever been faced with the question of whether a
student body as a whole, rather than just student-athletes, can be sub-
jected to suspicionless drug testing.
B. Developing a Framework for Analyzing Dragnet Drug Screening
of College Students
Drug testing of students performed by a state college is indisputa-
bly a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.t92 Despite
being such a search, it may be deemed a special need, and thus not
require individualized suspicion. The first question to answer is the
threshold inquiry required by Chandler and Ferguson-whether drug
testing of college students actually serves a special need. 193 If the drug
testing is deemed to be a special need, then courts should engage in a
balancing analysis to determine if the need is compelling enough to out-
weigh the privacy interest of the individual being tested.' 94
1. DOES COLLEGE DRUG TESTING SERVE A SPECIAL NEED?
Drug testing will not be deemed a special need in two circum-
stances-if its primary purpose is indistinguishable from a general inter-
est in law enforcement' 95 or if it is done for symbolic purposes rather
than an actual necessity.' 96 It should be obvious after Ferguson that if
law enforcement authorities are involved in a college drug testing pro-
gram, or if the students can be subjected to criminal penalties, the drug
testing program will not qualify as a special need.' 97 Under Chandler, a
drug testing scheme will be considered symbolic if there is no genuine
threat to public safety.'98
190. See supra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
193. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81 (2001) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520
U.S. 305, 321 (1997)).
194. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
830 (2002).
195. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81.
196. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
197. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83-84. See also Earls, 536 U.S. at 833 (noting that under the
drug testing scheme at issue the test results were not turned over to law enforcement); Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (noting the purpose of the drug testing was
"not to assist in the prosecution of employees").
198. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. Lower courts have indeed read Chandler to hold that
public safety must be in jeopardy before departing from the Fourth Amendment's individualized
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When the need is for public safety, the Court has consistently
viewed the "safety" accomplished by the drug testing as being for the
benefit of the public, or third parties, not the safety of the individuals
being tested. The only caveat to this principle is when the target class of
the drug testing is schoolchildren and the school authorities have an in
loco parentis, custodial relationship over the students.'99 With regard to
college students, the rationales of Acton and Earls do not apply, even if
college students are found to have a diminished expectation of privacy.
The level of the expectation of privacy affects only the balancing of
interests rather than the threshold inquiry of whether a need qualifies as
"special."200
Courts will not take a college's proposed need at face value, but
will examine the record to determine what the purpose of the drug test-
ing really is. 2° t It can be argued that drug testing student-athletes serves
the special need of reducing the risk of sports related injury.20 2 An ath-
lete on drugs can be a danger not only to herself, but to other competi-
tors and spectators as well.20 3 It is also true that some students do engage
in "safety-sensitive" tasks where drug testing might be a legitimate need.
For example, students handling dangerous chemicals in a science lab
could potentially pose a risk to public safety if they were abusing drugs.
Importantly, even though these threats to public safety may be potential
and the need preventative, they must still be genuine.204 Therefore, the
activities engaged in by students targeted for drug testing play a role in
determining the applicability of the special needs doctrine.
It is harder to make the case for drug testing ordinary college stu-
dents. While colleges may not want their students to partake in illegal
activities, such as drug use, a student's off-campus activities pose little
threat to the college campus. A hypothetical drug-intoxicated student in
the classroom who was disruptive to the learning environment could eas-
ily be singled out and disciplined accordingly. It seems even more
unlikely that drug-crazed college students will be running around cam-
suspicion requirement. See, e.g., Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139-41 (E.D.
Mich. 2000) (holding a Michigan law allowing for random, suspicionless drug testing of welfare
recipients unconstitutional because the government failed to show "that public safety is genuinely
placed in jeopardy").
199. See supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
200. Chandler is instructive. Had the Supreme Court made it past the threshold inquiry, the
political candidates likely would have been found to have a diminished expectation of privacy on
account of being subjected to statewide scrutiny while running for public office. However, this
was not mentioned in the opinion because it did not affect the threshold inquiry.
201. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81.
202. See Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 865 P.2d 633, 661 (1994). See also Vemonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995).
203. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 661.
204. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
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pus injuring those around them. Even if a college did have a legitimate
interest in making sure its students were not using drugs, there still
would have to be a genuine, rather than a merely speculative, threat to
safety. If the college reported little or no incidence of drug abuse among
its students, the need will likely be found "symbolic, not 'special.' 
2 o5
Also, even if there were evidence of drug use among the student body,
there would still have to be a connection to public safety, rather than just
the personal safety of the drug user.
Some school requirements that may raise issues of bodily integrity
and constitutional liberties do serve public safety concerns. For example,
a requirement of many colleges is that students receive certain vaccina-
tions prior to being able to attend classes. This is clearly different from a
drug test. First, vaccinations are not a search and do not reveal any per-
sonal information about the student.2 °6 They do potentially infringe on
civil liberties, however, as mandatory vaccinations have been challenged
on First Amendment grounds.2"7 Additionally, if one student has a con-
tagious disease, the entire campus community, professors and students
alike, is threatened. The risks vaccinations address clearly would satisfy
the requirement of a genuine threat to public safety if the Fourth Amend-
ment were ever invoked.2"8 It is not speculative that college students get
sick and can spread diseases to those around them. Contrarily, drug use
is not contagious and one student abusing drugs is not likely to make
those around him drug addicts or otherwise threaten their safety.
2. THE SPECIAL NEEDS BALANCING TEST FOR COLLEGE
DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS
Assuming a drug testing program geared toward college students is
found to serve a special need, it still must pass the balancing test applied
by the courts. The Supreme Court has analyzed three factors when con-
ducting the balancing test: "the nature of the privacy interest,"2 °9 "the
character of the intrusion,' 210 and "the nature and immediacy of the gov-
ernment's concerns and the efficacy" 211 of the drug testing program in
meeting them. The first two factors address the weight of a college stu-
205. Id. at 322.
206. However, Justice O'Connor has characterized vaccinations as "blanket searches of a sort."
Acton, 515 U.S. at 682 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
207. See, e.g., Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938 (E.D. Ark. 2002); Sherr v. Northport-
E. Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
208. One might imagine a student asserting a right to privacy in medical files when a college
demands proof of vaccination.
209. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 830 (2002).
210. Id. at 832.
211. Id. at 834.
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dent's privacy interest while the third addresses the weight of the col-
lege's asserted special need.
First, the nature of the privacy interest of a college student must be
analyzed. In Acton, the Court noted that the legitimacy of an expectation
of privacy varies with both context and the individual's relationship with
the state.212 The Court then declared that the fact that the subjects of the
search were children and that they had been "committed to the tempo-
rary custody of the State as schoolmaster"
213 were not only "central" 214
to its decision, but "the most significant element" 215 of it. Earls, relying
heavily on Acton, echoed this rationale to again find that schoolchildren
have a limited privacy interest.
216
Applying the rationales used to diminish the privacy interests of
public school students to college students would clearly be inappropri-
ate. With very few exceptions, all college students are at least eighteen
years old and are adults, not children. While in reality, many college
students may rely on their parents for financial support, college students
are their own legal guardians. Indeed, in Acton, the Court concluded by
cautioning "against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will
readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts. 121 7 Earls relied on
the reasoning of Acton and passed "constitutional muster" because the
drug testing program was being utilized in the same context-the public
school environment.21 8 While colleges and universities may want to
ensure the safety of their students, the doctrine of in loco parentis, which
was "central" to the Court's decisions in Acton and Earls, has been held
to be inapplicable to the college setting.21 9 Unlike public schools, col-
leges are not held responsible for the safety of their students and enjoy
no custodial relationship over them.220 An examination of several torts
cases reveals as much. In one case, parents of a university student sued
the school for allowing their daughter to associate with criminals, be
seduced, and use drugs.2 2 1 In a curt opinion granting a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, the court stated that the "plaintiffs completely
misconstrue the duties and functions of a university. '"222 The court
212. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 665.
216. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
217. Acton, 515 U.S. at 665 (emphasis added).
218. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830.
219. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 138-41 (3d Cir. 1979); Univ. of Denver v.
Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 59-60 (Colo. 1987). See also supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
220. See Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138-41, 143.
221. See Hegel v. Langsam, 273 N.E.2d 351, 352 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1971).
222. Id.
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declared that "[a] university is an institution for the advancement of
knowledge and learning. It is neither a nursery school, a boarding school
nor a prison. '' 221 The court added that universities have no duty "to regu-
late the private lives of their students." '224 Even students who have been
injured as a result of underage drinking at school-sponsored events have
not been able to persuade courts that their universities breached a
duty. 2 5 Courts have strongly adhered to the principle "that the modem
American college is not an insurer of the safety of its students" 226 and
have declined to impose a custodial duty on universities "to prevent stu-
dents from violating liquor control laws whenever those students are
involved directly or indirectly in a University activity. ' 227 Instead,
courts have contrasted elementary and high schools with colleges by
characterizing the former as "a mixture of custodial and educational
institutions" while characterizing colleges as "educational institutions,
not custodial. 228 One court noted that assigning colleges a custodial
role and requiring them to prevent underage drinking by their students
would be tantamount to requiring colleges "to babysit each student,"
which would "produce a repressive and inhospitable environment.
229
Though the custodial relationship rationale of Acton and Earls does
not apply to college students, Acton and Earls also considered, when
analyzing the students' privacy interests, the fact that the students chose
to participate in a particular activity.230 While compulsory education
laws required the students to attend school, the choice to participate in
school sports or other extracurricular activities was voluntary and the
student could choose not to participate and thus not be drug tested.231
Similarly, in Skinner, the Court held the railway workers to have a
diminished expectation of privacy "by reason of their participation in an
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 137 (college student became quadriplegic as a result of
automobile accident where he was passenger in a car driven by another student who had engaged
in underage drinking at a sophomore picnic); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 414-15 (Utah
1986) (college student on a university-sponsored field trip fell from a cliff after engaging in
underage drinking).
226. Bradshaw, 612 F.2d at 138. The Bradshaw court noted that while in earlier times the
doctrine of in loco parentis did apply to colleges, the shift to the modem view coincided with the
passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment lowering the age of majority to eighteen. See id. at
139-40.
227. Beach, 726 P.2d at 417-18. An analogy to violations of drug laws should be obvious.
228. Id. at 419. See also Univ. of Denver v. Whitlock, 744 P.2d 54, 60 (Colo. 1987) ("Today,
colleges and universities are regarded as educational institutions rather than custodial ones.").
229. Beach, 726 P.2d at 419.
230. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 831-32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
231. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety. 23 2 A similar
argument could be made for college students. They are not compelled by
law to attend college; rather, they choose to attend.
Though it could be argued that because of the increasing impor-
tance of a college education in our society, choosing to go to college is
not really a "choice" in the sense that choosing to play a sport is a
choice; this argument would likely be unavailing. In her dissent in Earls,
Justice Ginsburg made a similar argument when she attempted to distin-
guish the voluntariness of participating in extracurricular activities with
engaging in school sports. She noted that extracurricular activities "are
part of the school's educational program" and that "[p]articipation in
such activities is a key component of school life, essential in reality for
students applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant con-
tributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience.
' 233
This argument did not carry the day. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
used the concept of "choice" in Fourth Amendment cases to justify neg-
ative consequences for activities far more essential than going to
college.234
While college attendance is optional and may slightly diminish
one's expectation of privacy, this is not fatal to a Fourth Amendment
challenge. Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the govern-
ment may not condition receipt of a benefit or privilege on the relin-
quishment of a constitutional right.235 The unconstitutional conditions
doctrine applies, even when the government is under no duty to provide
the benefit in the first place. 36 Just as people do not automatically waive
232. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
233. Earls, 536 U.S. at 845 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's reasoning here is
somewhat troublesome as it seems to be based on her own arbitrary value judgment that school
sports are less important than extracurricular activities and that nonathletic activities, like the
school band or academic team, are "essential" while athletic activities are not. It has been noted
that Justice Ginsburg's Earls dissent "seemed to sound a personal note." Ricardo J. Bascuas,
Property and Probable Cause: The Fourth Amendment's Principled Protection of Privacy, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 575, 609 (2008). Arguing that a college education is a necessity rather than a
real choice would be a similar arbitrary value judgment not appropriate for legal analysis.
234. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991) (noting that the defendant was not
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes because his confinement was due to "his decision to take
the bus," rather than coercive police conduct, despite the fact that the defendant would have been
stranded had he exited the bus).
235. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004). See also Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). For an analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine
see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989).
236. See United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2006); Boykins v. Fairfield, Ala.
Bd. of Ed., 399 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1968) ("Even if the school board were under no obligation to
provide public education to children of military personnel on the air base, it could not provide that
education subject to an unconstitutional condition.").
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their Fourth Amendment rights by using the post office2 3 7 or a public
road, 238 a college education is a benefit conferred by the state, and the
state may not condition that benefit on a waiver of constitutional
rights.2 39 Therefore, the fact that college students choose to attend a state
school does not deprive them of their Fourth Amendment rights. "[Tlhe
very purpose of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is to prevent the
Government from subtly pressuring citizens. 24 ° While Fourth Amend-
ment protections certainly can be waived, the government cannot pres-
sure or induce a citizen to waive those rights.2 4'
Therefore, the fact that students choose to attend college may play a
role in analyzing their expectations of privacy, but does not by itself
constitutionalize suspicionless drug testing.242 However, within college,
the more regulated the activities a student takes part in, the more the
expectation of privacy has the potential to be diminished. Thus, while
the fact that college students choose to attend college may be considered
a factor and slightly diminish the privacy interests of the students, the
privacy interest is certainly not as diminished as that of schoolchildren
or even college athletes. Additionally, this is only one non-dispositive
factor that must be evaluated when balancing interests.
The nature of the intrusion is the next factor the Court considers
when balancing individual and state interests. The factors considered
here include how the urine sample is procured and how the results of the
test are used. 43 The level of intrusiveness of the procedure for obtaining
the sample varies based on where the sample is collected, 4w who col-
237. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
238. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
239. Morale v. Grigel, 422 F.Supp. 988, 999 (D.N.H. 1976).
240. Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1324.
241. See Scott, 450 F.3d at 865 n.4.
242. As noted supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court of Colorado has
held that college students' expectations of privacy are not diminished at all simply because they
choose to attend college. See also Piazzola v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1971) (A
college cannot "require a student to waive his protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
as a condition to his occupancy of a college dormitory room"); Morale, 422 F. Supp. at 999
(noting that a college "certainly cannot condition attendance ... upon waiver of constitutional
rights"); Collier v. Miller, 414 F. Supp. 1357, 1359, 1367 & n.l I (S.D. Tex. 1976) (noting that the
university did "not argue in their brief that a different Fourth Amendment standard should apply to
schools, nor would this Court find such an argument meritorious"); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.
Supp. 777, 786 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (holding adult college students have the same interest in the
privacy of their rooms as any adult has in his home).
243. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 832-34 (2002).
244. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 310 (1997) (candidate had option of providing urine
specimen at personal physician's office).
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lects the sample,245 whether the person is watched while urinating,246
whether the person is otherwise monitored,247 and whether the monitor
is of the same sex as the person being tested.248 For example in Chan-
dler, the Court noted that had the requisite special needs showing been
made, "the State could not be faulted for excessive intrusion. 249 Under
the Georgia statute at issue, a candidate for office was permitted to pro-
vide the urine sample in the office of his private physician.25° In Earls, a
faculty monitor waited outside a closed bathroom stall and listened "for
the normal sounds of urination" to avoid tampering and to establish a
chain of custody. 25 1 While this was clearly more intrusive than the drug
testing at issue in Chandler, the Court saw little problem with this
method of collection.25 2 In Acton, the faculty monitor was always of the
same sex as the student producing the sample.253 Such conditions were
"nearly identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms,
which men, women, and especially schoolchildren use daily. 254
Additionally, the use of the samples plays a role in weighing the
intrusiveness of the drug test. In Ferguson, the Court differentiated the
hospital's drug testing policy as a "far more substantial" invasion of
privacy than seen in its prior drug testing cases.255 There, the patients
did not know about the purpose of the test or the use of the results. 6
Also, in the prior cases, safeguards were in place to protect against the
dissemination of the results to third parties.257 In Ferguson, on the other
hand, the results not only were handed to third parties, but the third
parties were law enforcement officials.25 8 The Court in Skinner, Von
Raab, Acton, and Earls highlighted the fact that the results were not
245. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 626-27 (1989) ("The sample is
also collected in a medical environment, by personnel unrelated to the railroad employer.").
246. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 ("The regulations do not require that samples be furnished
under the direct observation of a monitor, despite the desirability of such a procedure to ensure the
integrity of the sample."); Earls, 536 U.S. at 832-33 ("This procedure is virtually identical to that
reviewed in Vernonia, except that it additionally protects privacy by allowing male students to
produce their samples behind a closed stall.").
247. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 832 (noting that the students are subject to aural rather than visual
monitoring). But see Univ. of Colo, ex rel. Regents of Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929,
939 (Colo. 1993) ("[T]he differences in practice between aural and visual monitoring might not
always be so great.").
248. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658, (1995).
249. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
250. See id. at 310.
251. Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
252. See id. at 833.
253. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
254. Id.
255. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. See id. at 79.
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handed over to law enforcement.259 The Earls Court also applauded the
level of confidentiality maintained in the test results, which were dis-
closed only to those with a "need to know. '26° Furthermore, the severity
of the consequences for failing a drug test factors into the evaluation of
the use of the sample and the nature of the intrusion.261 In Acton and
Earls, the penalty for failing a drug test was relatively minimal. The
student was not able to participate in the particular activity. However, no
record was made in the student's file and no academic sanctions such as
suspension or expulsion were imposed.262
As a third factor, the Court considers the nature and immediacy of
the government's concerns and the efficacy of the drug testing program
in meeting them. In Skinner, the concern was prevention of train acci-
dents caused by workers being intoxicated on the job.26 3 The Court
believed the drug testing scheme would be effective because of its deter-
rent effect on railway employees and in helping railroads determine if a
particular accident was caused by drug use or some other factor.264
Thus, the Court found the government's interest "compelling. 265 In
Acton, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, defined "compelling" as
"an interest that appears important enough to justify the particular search
at hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy. ' 266 The Court there
found deterring drug use among schoolchildren to be compelling given
that the children were in the care and temporary custody of the school
and that the effects of drugs are most severe on children. 267 The Court
also thought it important that the concern was immediate as "a large
segment of the student body, particularly those involved in interscholas-
tic athletics, was in a state of rebellion, that [d]isciplinary actions had
reached epidemic proportions, and that the rebellion was being fueled by
alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's misperceptions about
the drug culture. 268
Additionally, the program in Acton was narrowly tailored to school
athletes who were both the role models of the school that led the drug
259. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 833 (2002); Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,
666 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1989).
260. Earls, 536 U.S. at 833.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 833-34; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
263. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628-30.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 628.
266. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661.
267. See id. at 661-62.
268. Id. at 662-63 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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culture and more at risk of physical harm because drug use increases the
likelihood of sports-related injuries.269 In Earls, the Court found the ran-
dom drug testing program "reasonably effective" in ensuring the safety
and health of the students.270 In Chandler, on the other hand, the Court
found that even if there had been a special need, the drug testing scheme
was not an effective means of preventing candidates for office from
using drugs.271 The candidates knew in advance of the drug testing pro-
gram and could schedule the drug test on their own time.272 They could
easily stay "clean" for the purpose of the drug test and then resume drug
use, even when in office.2 73 In Skinner, as well, the Court noted that it
was important to the program's effectiveness that the employees did not
know when they were to be tested as a train accident is an unpredictable
occurrence.
274
IV. LINN STATE'S SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTING PROGRAM
A. The ACLU Files Suit: Barrett v. Claycomb
On September 14, 2011, the American Civil Liberties Union and
the ACLU of Eastern Missouri brought a § 1983 federal class action,
styled Barrett v. Claycomb, for declaratory and injunctive relief against
various officials on the Linn State Technical College Board of
Regents.2 5 On September 21, an amended complaint was filed. 276 The
plaintiff class representatives are four Linn State students: Michael Bar-
rett, IV, Branden Kittle-Aikeley, Shawn Kurgas, and Jacob Curliss.277
All four students are newly classified degree-seeking students enrolled
at Linn State for the fall 2011 semester. 278 The defendants include Don-
ald Claycomb, the President of the Board of Regents of Linn State, as
well as seven other Board of Regents officials.2 79
The plaintiffs seek to enjoin Linn State from drug testing its stu-
dents without individualized suspicion.28° On November 15, 2011,
269. See id.
270. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 837 (2002).
271. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319-20 (1997).
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 630 (1989).
275. See Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Barrett v. Claycomb,
2011 WL 5827783 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2011) (No. 11-CV-04242-NKL), available at http:Hwww.
aclu.org/files/assets/l -_complaint.pdf.
276. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
277. Id. at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 3-4.
280. Id. at 9.
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Judge Nanette K. Laughrey, of the Western District of Missouri, certi-
fied the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). 28t The
class consists of "current, and future, students of Linn State Technical
College who are, or will be, seeking degrees or certificates at the main
campus of the College in Linn, Missouri, or any other Linn State Tech-
nical College location.
282
On October 25, 2011, Judge Laughrey held a hearing on the plain-
tiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.283 She granted the motion on
Novemeber 18, 201 1.284 The Order does not contain a lengthy special
needs analysis, though Judge Laughrey did state:
The Court finds that there is a fair/likely chance that Defendants'
drug testing program will fail Fourth Amendment scrutiny because it
is over broad. Many students who have been tested are not involved
with heavy equipment and hazardous working conditions at the col-
lege. Therefore, it is unlikely that Defendants have any special need
to test those students. Thus, there is a fair/likely chance that the
Defendants' drug testing program will be found to be systemically
over broad as currently conceived.285
On December 16, 2011, Linn State filed a notice of interlocutory
appeal.286 Litigation in the case continues, and it appears the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit will be the first appellate
court to ever evaluate a mass drug testing scheme geared toward ordi-
nary college students.
B. Applying the Framework to Linn State's Dragnet
Drug Testing Scheme
Linn State's assertion of a special need survives only if the need
falls under the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
suspicionless searches. '287 Linn State's drug testing program does not
involve law enforcement authorities or criminal penalties.288 However,
this only begins the analysis, as the drug testing must be a response to a
281. Order at 4, Barrett v. Claycomb, 2011 WL 5822382, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2011)
(No. I 1-CV-04242-NKL).
282. First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 4.
283. Order at 1, Barrett v. Claycomb, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2011)
(No. 11 -CV-04242-NKL) [hereinafter Preliminary Injunction Order].
284. Id. at 2.
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. Docket of Proceedings, Barrett v. Claycomb, 2011 WL 5827783 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18,
2011) (No. 1 1-CV-04242-NKL).
287. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
288. See OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF LINN STATE TECHNICAL COLL., LSTC DRUG SCREENING
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genuine threat to public safety.289
Linn State declares that the drug testing is meant to support its mis-
sion to "'prepare students for profitable employment and a life of learn-
ing,' by guiding students in the development of safe workplace
habits. '2 90 Linn State adds that drug testing "is becoming an increas-
ingly important part of the world of work."'2 9 1 The school believes that
its drug testing program "will better provide a safe, healthy, and produc-
tive environment for everyone who learns and works at LSTC by
detecting, preventing, and deterring drug use and abuse among stu-
dents. '' 92 Notably, Linn State admits that it does not have large drug use
issue among its student body.2 93 Because it admits to lacking a signifi-
cant drug use problem, and because it has not instituted the drug testing
program in response to a genuine threat to public safety, Linn State's
drug screening program cannot qualify as a special need.294 Indeed, in
the current litigation, when considering the Barrett plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction, Judge Laughrey decided that Linn State would
not suffer any harm if the status quo of not drug testing students was
maintained. 95 She noted that Linn State "has operated successfully and
safely since the 1960s without drug or alcohol testing. No drug related
injury has ever been identified at the College. Therefore, the balance of
equities favor [sic] the status quo until resolution on a full record.
296
Additionally, Judge Laughrey noted the breadth of the program as
the factor that influenced her decision to grant the preliminary injunction
against Linn State.297 Linn State's drug screening program applies to all
students "who are newly classified as degree or certificate seeking at the
Linn State Technical College Campus or any Linn State Technical Col-
lege location and degree or certificate seeking students returning after
one or more semesters of non-enrollment. '298 This means that for the
first year of drug testing, the program will mainly affect all first-year
students. Because Linn State only offers two-year associate degrees,2 99
its entire student body will be subject to mandatory drug testing within
just two years. This is the most far-reaching drug testing program insti-
289. See supra Part III.B. I.
290. See Drug Screening, supra note 1.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. See Preliminary Injunction Order, supra note 283, at 1; Drug Screening, supra note 1.
294. See supra Part III.B.1.
295. See Preliminary Injunction Order, supra note 283, at 1.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 2 (declaring that the program is "systematically overbroad").
298. Drug Screening, supra note 1.
299. See Linn State Technical College: Facts, LINN ST. TECHNICAL C., http://www.linnstate
linnstate.edu/about/facts.php.
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tuted by any college and is even more expansive than the high school
drug testing programs previously condoned by the Supreme Court.
Many of these students, including all of the class representatives in the
current litigation, are not engaged in hazardous activities and do not han-
dle any heavy machinery on campus. 3° Judge Laughrey's opinion
seemed to imply that the drug testing program could be considered a
special need if the targeted students were all engaged in some type of
hazardous activity. 30' Judge Laughrey's intuition reflects Chandler's
public safety requirement.
Assuming, arguendo, that Linn State's asserted reason even were a
legitimate purpose to drug test its students without suspicion, a balanc-
ing of interests would favor the students' individual privacy rights.
Three factors weigh in Linn State's favor. First, college students may
have a slightly diminished expectation of privacy due to their choice to
attend college.30 2 Second, urine samples are collected by a private com-
pany that follows federal drug screening guidelines.30 3 Finally, only
those with "a legitimate need to know" are informed of a student's drug
test results. 3°
Regarding the lessened expectation of privacy, the diminishment is
only slight and does not compare to that of student-athletes or public
schoolchildren. 35 Additionally, as noted above, a college may not con-
dition enrollment on the waiver of a constitutional right and the lowered
expectation of privacy (if lowered at all) must still be overcome by the
college's need. 3° Furthermore, while Linn State does claim to follow
less intrusive federal guidelines, the nature of the intrusion is still
increased by the fact that students are pulled out of class, thus disrupting
the lesson.30 7 Linn State adds insult to injury by forcing students to sub-
sidize the cost of invading their privacy by adding the cost of the drug
screen to their tuition. 3 8 Additionally, even giving Linn State the benefit
of the doubt that those it deems to have "a legitimate need to know"
really comprises a narrow group of individuals, any student who has
been administratively withdrawn from the school will have a "badge of
shame" on their record as it will be obvious that those who are with-
drawn likely failed a drug test.3 09
300. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
301. See Preliminary Injunction Order, supra note 283, at 2.
302. See supra Part III.B.2.
303. See Drug Screening, supra note 1.
304. See PROCEDURES, supra note 288, at 7.
305. See supra Part III.B. 1.
306. See supra Part III.B.l.
307. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 3, at 6.
308. See Drug Screening, supra note 1.
309. C.f Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
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The harshness of the consequences of a positive drug screen plays a
role in the balancing of individual privacy interests with those of the
state.31 ° In the high school cases, the penalty for failing a drug test was
not being able to participate in the particular extracurricular activity.3 1
At Linn State, a refusal to submit to a drug screen results in an adminis-
trative withdrawal.312 If a student does submit to a drug screen and the
result is positive, she "will have a period of approximately 45 days to
rescreen and test negative to remain enrolled."'3 13 Aside from criminal
penalties, involuntary withdrawal is the most severe penalty a college
can impose on its students. Perhaps if the penalty were to prohibit the
student from engaging in certain dangerous activities, Linn State's argu-
ment would be strengthened; however, the severity of the current conse-
quences weighs against Linn State.
The only factor that can actually add any weight to Linn State's
side of the scales is the nature and immediacy of the school's concerns
and the efficacy of the drug testing program in meeting them. However,
Linn State's program fails to address an immediate concern or effec-
tively address even a general problem of campus drug use. Linn State's
asserted purpose of developing "safe workplace habits" '314 based on the
fact that drug testing is becoming more prevalent "in the world of
work",3t 5 is tantamount to saying that because their students may be drug
tested by their future employers, they should get used to it now. How-
ever, college students do not need to be trained to urinate in a cup. They
are surely capable of doing it right the first time when their employers
ask them to. Simply stated, there is no immediate concern.
It appears Linn State's real purpose is to send a message to pro-
spective employers that its students are already "clean" and perhaps sub-
servient. Indeed, The New York Times interviewed one of Linn State's
attorneys and asked him if Linn State had a problem with graduates
failing drug tests at their jobs and, if so, whether that was the reason for
the drug screening program.3 6 The attorney responded that although he
could not give specific examples, it would not surprise him if that were
true and doubted that the program would have been initiated if that were
not a problem. 3 7 The attorney also admitted that Linn State lacks any
310. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
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statistics on its graduates.31 8 Whatever public relations effect Linn
State's drug screening program may have on future student employment,
the need is not "special," nor is it immediate enough to overcome indi-
vidual privacy interests.
Additionally, the drug testing program is not even an effective
means of achieving Linn State's goals. Students know approximately
when they will be drug tested and can simply refrain from drug use for a
brief period of time before the test. They can then resume drug use with-
out fear of being caught. Students know that once they pass the first drug
test, they will not be subject to additional testing without cause.319 The
Supreme Court criticized the drug testing program in Chandler as inef-
fective for the same reason. In short, the analysis of Linn State's drug
testing program should not even get past the initial threshold inquiry, but
even if it did, Linn State's "need" does not outweigh its students' pri-
vacy interests.
V. CONCLUSION
Some view urinalysis drug testing as "seriously embarrass[ing],"
while others may view a drug test as a minor inconvenience, rather than
a major threat to their constitutional liberties.32" ' This Conclusion is
addressed to the latter. Indeed, requiring a person to urinate in a cup in
order to attain the benefit of higher education, conferred by the state,
does not evoke the same emotions as thoughts of government agents
ransacking homes in the middle of the night.322 Some may even see
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
321. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
841 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). At the trial in University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, one student
testified as follows:
Q Who was there outside the room?
A Terry, [a female trainer,] I believe.
Q Were you watched while you were providing the sample?
A No.
Q How did you feel about the process of someone standing outside while you were
providing the sample?
A It bothered me.
Q Why?
A Because it's embarrassing. No one should have to watch someone else pee. It's a
private thing, shouldn't be more people in the bathroom. I thought, when I came, I
thought it was, you know, they made it seem so minor and it seemed like it was
going to be like you go to the doctor and you pee and you put it in a little thing and
they open the little door and they take it, you know. The way they made it seem, it
didn't seem like it would be that bad until the meeting.
Univ. of Colo. ex rel. Regents of Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 939 n.20 (Colo. 1993).
322. Sundby, supra note 81, at 501-02.
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college drug testing as a good policy that will deter students from using
drugs at a formative time in their lives. However, constitutional analysis
requires using principles to lead to outcomes, not vice versa.3 23 The spe-
cial needs doctrine may have a place in Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, but it cannot be abused as a license to allow the government to
engage in suspicionless searches whenever individualized suspicion is
inconvenient. Getting a warrant is always an inconvenience, as is gather-
ing enough evidence to show probable cause. But these are inconve-
niences that are constitutionally mandated.324 While Linn State's drug
testing program may be well intentioned, it is not constitutional. As Jus-
tice Brandeis famously remarked, "[t]he greatest dangers to liberty lurk
in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding. 325
"No one would want to live in an Orwellian world in which the
government assured a drug-free America by randomly testing the urine
of all its citizens. '326 The Supreme Court has not created a drug testing
exception to the Fourth Amendment, but rather a very limited special
needs exception.327 Drug testing ordinary college students without any
individualized suspicion, like mass fingerprinting, opening the mail, or
searching off-campus houses of college students, is not a special need.
Rights are slowly eroded, not fully taken away at once. 328 The erosion
begins when "immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure
which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before
which even well settled principles of law will bend. '329 As Justice Mar-
shall noted, "principles of law, once bent, do not snap back easily. 33°
Allowing even a minor inconvenience, where public safety is not imme-
323. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179-80 (1989).
324. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) ("The investigation of crime would always
be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those
who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally
sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law.").
325. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967). Though it is somewhat clichd to conclude an article on the Fourth Amendment by
quoting from Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead, an attempt to articulate these ideas more
eloquently would be futile.
326. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., AFL-CIO v. Roberts, 9 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1993).
327. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (noting that the special needs exception
is a "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches").
328. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("[l]llegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing in ... silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of
procedure."), overruled on other grounds by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
329. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 654 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
330. Id. at 655.
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diately threatened, opens the door for further suspicionless searches and
expands a doctrine that is supposedly based on a status of being special,
extraordinary, and limited. As one Fourth Amendment scholar observed,
"[t]oo often, what might seem at worst a minor misstep at the time turns
out, when viewed from the clearer perspective provided by the passage
of time, to have been a step over the cliff."
33
Justice Brandeis instructed that in order to protect our "right to be
let alone," '332 "every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment," and we should "be most
on our guard to protect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent. '333 Teeth must be given to the label of a "closely
guarded' ' 334 exception to individualized suspicion; otherwise, many
pages of the U.S. Reports would be reduced to meaningless rhetoric
rather than law.
While admittedly Linn State's drug screening program is a far
reach from indiscriminately searching people's homes, this is an indis-
criminate search of people's bodies. The thought of citizens lining up to
prove to the state that they are law-abiding by sacrificing even a thread
of their bodily integrity is anathema to the adversarial process of our
system of justice. Investigation, individualized suspicion, and a pre-
sumption of innocence are inseparable from that system. We cannot sac-
rifice constitutional principles because under a certain set of facts a
particular outcome seems appealing.335 We must engage in the analysis
methodically to arrive at the result that comports with our Constitution.
331. Wayne R. LaFave, Computers, Urinals, and the Fourth Amendment: Confessions of A
Patron Saint, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2553, 2581 (1996).
332. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled
by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
Brandeis believed this right to be "the most comprehensive of ights and the ight most valued by
civilized men." Id.
333. Id. at 478-79 (emphasis added).
334. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
335. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Indeed, it is quite possible
that our nation would be safer if police were permitted to stop and search anyone they wanted, at
any time, for no reason at all. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968) (requiring that police demonstrate individualized suspicion that a suspect is armed before
frisking him). Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment embodies a value judgment by the Framers
that prevents us from gradually trading ever-increasing amounts of freedom and privacy for
additional security. It establishes searches based on evidence-rather than potentially effective,
broad, prophylactic dragnets-as the constitutional norm.").
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